

Dewey and Thorndike: The Persistence of Paradigms in Educational Scholarship

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Dewey and Thorndike are taken to be the fountain heads of the new academic fields of philosophy and psychology of education at the start of this century. Their general programs as scholars and applied researchers in education remain crucial in the ways philosophers and psychologists approach philosophy and psychology of education. Although the substantive ideas and even specific paradigms of research have changed radically in both fields during this century, philosophers and psychologists of education pursue general goals similar to those of Thorndike and Dewey. Nevertheless, the two fields have each gone their own way. The final argument calls attention to their similarities and that claims we have more to gain by merging their purposes than by keeping them apart.

Dewey et Thorndike sont présentés comme les pères de la philosophie et de la psychologie de l'éducation, au début du XX^e siècle. On soutient que leurs démarches comme penseurs et comme chercheurs effectuant des études de nature pratique dans le domaine de l'éducation sont encore aujourd'hui reprises par les philosophes et les psychologues s'intéressant à l'éducation. Bien que les idées fondamentales et même les paradigmes de la recherche aient changé radicalement dans ces deux domaines au cours du XX^e siècle, il n'en demeure pas moins vrai que les philosophes et les psychologues s'intéressant à l'éducation poursuivent des buts généraux semblables à ceux de Thorndike et de Dewey. Quoi qu'il en soit, philosophes et psychologues se sont engagés dans des voies distinctes. L'article souligne leurs similitudes et les avantages à tirer d'une mise en commun de leurs buts.

In the early part of this century, two great figures, one from philosophy and the other from psychology, dominated the scene in educational thought, scholarship, and practice. John Dewey, the philosopher, elaborated his progressive conception of education and school people flocked to the cause of putting traditional educational practices to rest. Dewey's legacy is still with us, and educational debates are still framed in progressive vs. traditionalist terms. E. L. Thorndike, the psychologist, established the "laws of learning," wrote arithmetic texts, and produced a count of common words that resulted in the development of basal readers and devices for assessing the difficulty of reading materials. The impact of Thorndike's work also remains with us today. However, it is not the details or specifics of their contributions that I wish to put before you. Instead, I will argue that Dewey and Thorndike each provided paradigmatic conceptions of how philosophy and

psychology should address themselves to educational matters and that their overarching conceptions of the central tasks of educational philosophers and psychologists persist today despite radical substantive changes and developments in both the philosophy and psychology of education.¹

DEWEY AND THORNDIKE: SCHOLARS AND EDUCATORS

Early in his career, Thorndike the *scholar-scientist* used laboratory and animal experiments to establish and refine scientifically the “laws of learning” and produced his influential three-volume work, *Educational Psychology*. In these scholarly activities, he saw the goal of scientific psychology to be discovery and diffusion of knowledge. Knowledge of how mental activity transpired seemed *prima facie* to Thorndike and to other psychologists of the time to be of direct use to educators (even though Dewey and James had some reservations about the directness of the connection). As *educator-scientist*, on the other hand, Thorndike set about to gather facts that would allow him to construct more precise and useful educational materials. He himself probably drew no line between the different activities of scholar-scientist and educator-scientist, but, in his direct attack on educational problems, he was more the applied than the basic scientist, more the engineer and technological innovator than the scholarly researcher.

Both of these conceptions of the proper role of psychology in education live on today. The clearest models of them are Piaget, the scholar-scientist seeking a scientific understanding of human development, and B. F. Skinner, the educator-scientist inventing teaching machines and programmed instruction. Lawrence Kohlberg with his basic research on moral development and his applied work on *just schools* also continues the Thorndike pattern, as does Jerome Bruner, who takes turns wearing the different hats of basic laboratory researcher (cognition and perception) and applied educator (1960, 1966, 1970).

Turning to Dewey, we can see a similar bifurcation in his work. While at the University of Chicago, Dewey the *educator-philosopher* used the laboratory school to apply actively and test his ideas, and he encouraged his staff to develop new curricula and materials (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936). In his major educational writings, however, Dewey the *scholar-philosopher* carved out a basic place for philosophy in tandem with psychology, to provide knowledge relevant to the solution of social and educational problems. Science, Dewey believed, was the most efficacious mode of inquiry that human beings had produced in their long evolutionary history, and it would provide the empirical knowledge needed. Philosophy’s role, on the other hand, was to provide social problem definition and wisdom, a normative reflection on where we as human beings had been in our social and historical development and where we might aspire to go in making a better world for ourselves.

His *Democracy in Education* (1916) was a major work of historical and philosophical analysis identifying contemporary (and historically derived) problems of educational thought and practice. The dualisms that Dewey sought to resolve—labour and leisure, theory and practice, liberal and technical education, and so on—were taken by him to be derivatives of faulty epistemological thought going back to the Greeks and from the historically persistent high-low, dual class system of Western civilization. He believed that science and the industrial revolution had put into human hands the material resources needed to overcome these deeply entrenched and antidemocratic dichotomies. It but remained for Dewey the philosopher-scholar to show us how to reconceptualize the human condition, to reconstruct our process of education, and to transform our social world into his image of the good democratic society.

Dewey saw the philosopher's role not as discoverer of new knowledge—that was for the scientist to do—but as a conceptual problem-finder who traced the historical sources of our received ways of thinking and recast them into a new idiom for potential resolution. His creative and unique contribution came by way of his masterful, organically connected reorganization and transformation of such basic educational concepts as learning, experience, thinking, growth, aims, vocation, democratic society, curriculum, subject matter, and method. These were not analyses of concepts in the Rylean manner as much as they were naturalistically based and organically connected reconceptualizations of fundamental educational ideas aimed at the improvement of education and society.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

We all know the standard recounting of what happened after Dewey in American philosophy of education. In the universities and in educational theory, there were the competing schools—of realists and idealists, Thomists and Marxists, pragmatists and existentialists—each offering a competing metaphysically based conception of education while vying for academic and even moral supremacy while, in educational practice, traditionalists and progressives vied for control of the organization and purposes of the schools. The so-called (analytic) revolution in philosophy (of education) after midcentury sought to overturn the forces of confused and loose metaphysical and normative speculation about education and replace them with a corps of philosophers whose rigorous thinking was aimed at the clarification of educational concepts that would bring a more sophisticated understanding to our ways of thinking about education. It was assumed that clarification would provide educators not with answers but with a sound conceptual geography of educational space in which they could seek their own answers and chart their own directions.²

In the U.S., Scheffler's work was highly influential in the taking of the analytic turn and, I believe, set the North American tone of piece meal analyses of educational concepts. Not only was his pioneering anthology *Philosophy of Education* (1958) a work of bits and pieces, but his *Language of Education* (1960) focused narrowly on definitions of education, educational slogans, metaphors, and a comparative analysis of the concepts of *teaching* and *telling*. His *Conditions of Knowledge* (1965) was likewise narrow in scope, dealing mainly with an analysis of propositional knowledge (knowing that) and only briefly with skills (knowing how). While each of his works provided an exemplar of deft philosophical analysis of some part of the conceptual domain of education, none seemed aimed at a broad, comprehensive view.³

The work of Peters in England, on the other hand, was a much bolder analytic attack on education in its fullest sense and in all its major related pieces. Illuminating his basic view of education seemed always to be Peters' target, no matter which concepts he might specifically be addressing in one of his many books or articles. He was also politically astute and largely responsible for making philosophy of education a more accepted part of philosophy in the British academic establishment than it has ever become in the United States. He has rightly been recognized as the leading figure in the analytic philosophy of education movement, and I will use him here as my paradigmatic exemplar.

There are idiosyncratic as well as historically understandable specific features of Peters' work that make it quite different substantively and methodologically from Dewey's work, but I will argue, contrary to what is ordinarily believed about the midcentury revolution and radical change in ways of philosophizing about education, that Peters' work fits the Deweyan paradigm of the philosopher-scholar addressing education in its fullest sense, identifying contemporary problems, offering refined conceptualizations of key concepts, and providing a comprehensive view of the best form for education and society to take.

I will take two major works to be representative of his approach: *Ethics and Education* (1966) and *The Logic of Education* with Paul Hirst (1970).⁴ Peters begins *Ethics and Education* with his well-known analysis of the concept of education. He uses analytic techniques to elaborate the fundamental meaning of education in almost the same way that Dewey does in his first two chapters of *Democracy in Education* where he analytically describes education as "a necessity of life" and as "a social necessity." As is well known, education for Peters turns out to be the transmission of worthwhile knowledge and understandings in an appropriate manner. Peters then goes to the heart of the matter by asking how we can justify claims for what is to be considered educationally worthwhile and how we can judge the propriety of educational procedures. These, for Peters, are ultimately ethical questions that he sets

out to answer directly. He argues that philosophical ethics should be viewed as a justification of our publicly presumed ethical principles in our shared forms of moral discourse.

Not only does he deal with the basic ethical principles of equality, freedom, and respect for persons, but he also treats the educational ideas of interests, worthwhile activities, educational opportunity, authority, punishment, and discipline, and he ends with a chapter called "Democracy and Education." In substance, this last chapter is far from Dewey's treatment of the topic in his book by the same name, but the purposes of their treatments of education are similar. Both works offer a comprehensive examination of concepts relevant to the full explication of a normative view of education and the good life and good society that each promises to bring about and sustain.

For Peters, democracy turns out to be the rational way of life that has at its ethical core the fundamental values of equality, freedom, and respect for persons—the basic values he treats in his book. For Dewey, democracy is free association in an open society where multiple experiences are possible for education to take place continually. For both, education can provide the means to produce the educated person and to sustain a democratic form of social life, if only it is properly conceived. For all the talk in Peters' work about analysis "leaving things as they are" and only providing the thinking person with a clearer conception of ideas undergirding our notions of education, I submit that Peters, like Dewey, sketches (and recognizes that he is doing so) a comprehensive view of education as an ideal to be sought after actively.

In *The Logic of Education*, Hirst and Peters set out to dispose of the debate between traditionalists and progressives⁵ by providing their own specific view of education as human development by means of initiation into our public forms of knowledge. Once again, the chapter titles bespeak the comprehensive intent of the work: Philosophy, Education, Development, The Curriculum, Teaching, Personal Relationships, and Educational Institutions. While treating each of these topics analytically, Hirst and Peters in good Deweyan fashion also pay attention to historical predecessors, current problems, and issues of a practical sort in each of these areas. Like Dewey, their concern is to help us to reconceptualize education so as to escape our inefficient dualistic, historically derived conception (traditionalist vs. progressive) and overcome certain important contemporary social, political, economic, and educational problems. The similarity in approach and purpose to the Deweyan paradigm is striking.

While the analytic tradition in contemporary philosophy of education lives on, there is no doubt that it has lost its youthful vitality. Its old rivals, the phenomenologists and existentialists, are still around, but if we look at

the contemporary scene, we find that neo-Marxist critiques of the analytic approach seem to be generating the most sparks. The main arguments of this critical attack seem to be that the analysis of current, dominant educational concepts is a conservative enterprise which justifies the status quo and that there is no recognition of the persistent class and power structures of society which education reproduces. Whether calling for the overcoming of false consciousness, the empowerment of the masses, the development of critical consciousness, or the deschooling of society, neo-Marxists seek to reconceptualize education and to redefine educational problems in terms of social class, power, property vs. person rights and the relation of school to society. It seems clear to me that their general purpose is also Deweyan, to make a better world by correcting the consequences of our misconceptions and superficial perceptions of social and educational matters. While radical in substance, their program nevertheless seems to fit the Deweyan philosopher-scholar paradigm.⁶

Of course, a much fuller and more sustained argument with appropriate evidence would be necessary to establish my claims, but there seems to be enough here at least to suggest strongly that there has been and continues to be a persistence in philosophy of education of the Deweyan search for an adequate reconceptualization of education that will help us achieve a good and just society. The original Platonic role of philosopher of education dies hard.

PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

How then fares the Thorndikean psychology and education paradigm? My treatment here will need to be even briefer, but it will be no less insistent on the persistence of his programmatic paradigms of basic and applied educational research. The scientific-scholar tradition in psychology is still strong even though in the U.S. it has moved away from the narrow experimentalist-associationist-behaviourist mode that dominated the field in the first half of this century. In the 1960s, the emergence of cognitive psychology (Bruner, Neisser) using an information processing model of mind relegitimated the scientific study of the mind and its inner workings. The rediscovery of Piaget by American psychologists about the same time offered a new perspective on cognitive development that, while it deviated from the strict experimentalist mode of inquiry and a Hullian hypothetico-deductive model of scientific theory, still offered carefully collected empirical evidence in support of its theoretical claims. Work in other fields, such as linguistics (Chomsky, 1968), ethology (Lorenz, 1970) within the psychology community itself, and artificial intelligence (Turing, 1964) also added impetus to the acceptance of a broader view of what counted as legitimate scientific psychological inquiry.

These scholarly efforts to understand mind were also duly noted in the educational community, and there were attempts to use them to illuminate educationally relevant topics and even to construct curricula and programs. (Witness the effects of Piaget's and Kohlberg's views on developments in the school curriculum, for example). Thorndike's belief that the basic scientific knowledge provided by psychology can be of great use to educators is a persistent one.

But what of the applied educator-scientist aspect of the Thorndikean paradigm? As we all know, during the first quarter of this century, psychology separated from philosophy and went its own way in pursuit of becoming a legitimate academic discipline. Then, educational psychology separated from its parent and sought to establish its own identity in schools and departments of education. In this way, educational psychology institutionally took on the Thorndikean role of educator-scientist applying psychological findings to educational matters and doing research on education directly.

Glaser (1978) dates the establishment of an independent field of educational psychology from the 1933 publication of Pressey's very influential textbook, *Psychology and the New Education*.⁷ Pressey's preface makes clear that his work is intended to be "a sweeping reorganization of the usual treatment of educational psychology." No longer would the focus be on the presentation of a systematic treatment of psychology (as the scholar Thorndike had done in 1913); instead, the discipline would be aimed at "maximal usefulness in contributing to the understanding of educational problems." Pressey further characterized his approach and set the new pattern for educational psychology as follows:

Not only is there a gross reorganization of the material in order to make the treatment more practical and functional for teacher training, but, throughout, this practical and functional point of view markedly affects the selection of material. The discussion of learning begins not with the escape of cats from a box, but with a "field study" of children cooperating in the solving of a puzzle. The learning curves show progress in school subjects. And the forgetting curves show forgetting not of nonsense syllables, but of arithmetic, history, chemistry. The writer does not question the value of animal experimentation or work in the psychological laboratory. But he feels that educational psychology should deal with children, and the learning of school materials, in school; he feels also that the subject has now progressed far enough that it can develop its topics in terms of its own subject matter. ... The purpose of the text is pragmatic: to give a clear and straightforward interpretation of the facts under discussion in such fashion as to be of the greatest possible service to the teacher.

As we all well know, belief in the value of a direct frontal attack on educational phenomena using various methodologies of "scientific" research has grown since Thorndike's and Pressey's day into a large multinational educational research community that stretches beyond educational psychology

per se, that explores, treats, tests, and measures educational phenomena and reports its findings in thousands of pages of print annually. Trust in direct research in education seems to have become the dominant article of faith in the minds and hearts of the public and professionals alike. While there have been some misgivings and concerns for the lack of success or even progress in educational research, the idea that Dewey and Thorndike shared, that science provides the best hope we have to find solutions to our problems of practice, remains. The Thorndikean educator-scientist paradigm persists.

THE PERSISTENCE OF PARADIGMS

Why do both the philosophical and the psychological paradigmatic postures of Dewey and Thorndike toward education persist? I believe that they each serve very fundamental human needs, or in Habermas' terms, speak directly to our technical, practical, and emancipatory human interests.

Psychology (and much of empirical educational research) seeks to fulfill our need to understand how things work. We live in a world of causal connections. Our ability to survive and sustain ourselves has been enhanced by our ability to discern such connections. On the plentiful evidence of the history of our species, we believe that causal knowledge gives us a modicum of control over processes and outcomes important to us. We do not know how many causal connections exist that we have not yet discovered, and so we keep on looking. Many believe, rightly or wrongly, that understanding how the mind works will make us better educators and that conceiving of education as a technical process will give us great control over its outcomes. The technical-psychological paradigm persists in spite of all the impossibility arguments mounted against it and all the critiques of its evil effects and the narrowness of our technical interest. There is no doubt in my mind that it will continue to persist because we firmly believe that there is some causal connection between teaching and learning.

The philosophical task of reconceptualizing education also persists and serves our practical and emancipatory interests. Many contemporary scholars still seek to conceive of education in a way that will help us to better understand and deal with basic human issues and problems. One of the most influential recent scholarly reconceptions of education has been put forward by the historian Lawrence A. Cremin. Criticizing Cubberly's narrow view of education as schooling, Cremin set out in his massive, three-volume history of education to trace and treat education broadly conceived as

the deliberate, systematic sustained effort to transmit or evoke knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, and sensibilities, a process that is more limited than what the anthropologist would term enculturation or the sociologist socialization, though obviously inclusive of some of the same elements. (1970, p. xiii)

Although infelicitous and in need of philosophical clarification, this reconceptualization has achieved wide acceptance and served educators and researchers well in forcing many to recognize the multiple educational forces at work in our society. Feinberg, in his *Understanding Education* (1983), has more recently argued that we need an agreed-upon broad and fundamental reconceptualization of education that can serve all educational researchers as the target of their mutual inquiries. He proposes that education be conceived of as the process of the social reproduction of the roles, skills, "consciousness," and symbolic codes of a society in each succeeding generation. His view echoes the Wittgenstein-Winch-Taylor-Harré and Secord forms-of-life-interpretivist view of social science, and yet he leaves a place in his proposal for a serious critique of society and for moral considerations of the proper course for education to take.

Both Cremin and Feinberg, however morally concerned they may be with education, can be read as treating education as socialization more than as a moral enterprise aimed at the development of persons. Nyberg and Egan (1981) have argued that the distinction is very important to maintain: that socialization is a haphazard process we all cannot help but undergo as we become members of our society, whereas education is an intentional activity deliberately aimed at providing what is good, right, and essential to becoming an educated person. Along this same line, Jane Roland Martin's recent work has taken to task Hirst and Peters' conception of the educated person. Her critique has been that their view is narrowly cognitive and fails to consider the education of our feelings and emotions and the moral sensitivities of persons. She is currently working on a reconceptualization of the educated person from a feminist perspective.

In this brief sketch of some current reconceptualizations of education, I have only noted some of the work; much more is being done, including the work of the neo-Marxists barely mentioned in this paper. They seem to be most concerned with developing a morally responsible conception of education in the service of our emancipatory human interests. All such descriptive and normative reconceptualizations of education seek to fulfill our human need to understand, to find meaning in, and to see the point of the educational enterprise. We recognize the intentional characteristic of education and want to be sure that our educational activities aim at and result in the good as best we can conceive of it. Our practical and emancipatory human interests motivate our philosophical critiques and reconceptualization of education as a human moral enterprise. These interests are also brought to bear whenever we find cases of social injustice seemingly attributable to the forms our educational actions and institutions take. Reform movements abound in education, not just to make schooling better in and of itself but to make for a better society and better-educated persons. In these many

ways, the Deweyan philosophical paradigm clearly persists in the service of our human concerns.

Must these two paradigms, the philosophical and the psychological, retain their singular identities and remain separated from each other? Can they only be conceived of as a proper division of labour—one concerned with ends, the other with means? I think the time is right to see psychology as a historically persistent attempt to conceptualize and reconceptualize aspects of human mental functioning in ways that allow us to bring empirical evidence to bear on our claims to provide some understanding of how we think, perceive, learn, develop, and behave. It is as much a conceptual and argument-producing enterprise as is philosophy, and given its effects on persons, it ought also to develop normative concerns.

And philosophy of education, while primarily conceptual and normative, is just as instrumental and means-oriented as is psychology. Philosophers believe that clear conceptions, sound arguments, and duly justified normative positions can serve as the means to facilitate the achieving of good educational ends by educators. I believe that the trick to living comfortably and productively with these two persistent paradigms is to see them in this way. Both provide us not with answers but with sometimes useful and, to some degree, justified conceptualizations of education and educationally relevant phenomena. As educators we need the most creative and critical work in both philosophy and psychology to give us perspective and to help us to reflect responsibly on what we are trying to do. This happens in a world where final answers and perfect solutions will never be found but where we each of us struggle and do our damndest to achieve noble human purposes. In this sense, the paradigmatic tasks in education set by Dewey and Thorndike persist, but the separation of philosophy and psychology that they represent in our minds needs to be overcome if we are to be able to build progressively on their legacy as scholars and educators.

NOTES

¹ I will be using the term *paradigm* in a loose non-technical way in this paper to refer to how disciplinary practitioners perceive the major tasks and general purposes of their discipline with regard to education. I trust that my meaning will become clear in use. The Kuhnian concept of paradigm is much more sophisticated and complex (though perhaps not much clearer) than what I intend here. I will not be claiming in the Kuhnian sense that the “disciplinary matrix” of either psychology or philosophy has persisted in this century in either the parent fields or in education. That is patently false. What I will be arguing is that the general approach and purposes of psychologists and philosophers who work in education has not changed.

² This was the positive program of analytic philosophy. It also had and continues to have a critical program that is in the best philosophical tradition of questioning

assumptions, ideas, and arguments in a way that forces reflection on our basic beliefs, commitments, values, and ideals. In this paper I will not deal with this critical aspect of the philosophical paradigm (which Dewey also shared) although it has always been part of "doing philosophy."

- ³ I was Scheffler's doctoral student in the early 1960s. R. S. Peters visited Harvard in 1961, and I did a seminar with him in which we explored classical ethical theorists as he prepared himself to write *Ethics and Education* (1966). We both attended Scheffler's seminar, in which a careful reading of Chisholm's *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* (1957) was done. It was not at all clear what relation it had to education, if any. Scheffler also taught the basic philosophy of education course. I served as his course assistant one term, and it turned out to be an almost finished version of his *Conditions of Knowledge* manuscript. His philosophy of science course was his *Anatomy of Inquiry* first-draft form, and there was little comprehensive treatment of the field. There was, as I recall, a definite bits-and-pieces atmosphere at the Harvard I attended.
- ⁴ Of course, Peters also had a hand in producing many collections of analytic essays. Analysis is a form of philosophizing that readily lends itself to such a format.
- ⁵ Dewey also set out to dissolve this debate in his *Child and the Curriculum* (1902) at the turn of the century!
- ⁶ While time does not allow me to get into detailed exposition here, there are also contemporary examples of the other side of Dewey the educator-philosopher. Perhaps the most single-minded educatorphilosopher on the current scene is Matthew Lipman, who has developed a full-blown curriculum from preschool to middle school to teach critical thinking. His program is called *Philosophy for Children*.
- ⁷ The quotations which follow were taken by Glaser from Pressey (1933), pp. xxvii-xxix.

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Dewey und Thorndike werden als die Urheber der akademischen Bereiche der Philosophie und Psychologie der Erziehungswissenschaften, die Anfang dieses Jahrhunderts eingeführt wurden, angesehen. Ihre allgemeinen Studienprogramme als Gelehrte und Wissenschaftler, die angewandte Forschung in den Erziehungswissenschaften betreiben, immer noch die Grundzüge darstellen, wie Philosophen und Psychologen die Aufgaben der Philosophie und der Psychologie in den Erziehungswissenschaften angeben. Obwohl sich die wesentlichen Ideen und sogar die spezifischen Paradigmen der Forschung auf beiden Gebieten während dieses Jahrhunderts radikal geändert haben, wird immer noch behauptet, daß, hinsichtlich übergreifender Absichten, Philosophen und Psychologen der Erziehungswissenschaften allgemeine Ziele, die denen von Thorndike und Dewey ähnlich sind, verfolgen. Die beiden Bereiche sind jedoch jeweils ihren eigenen Weg gegangen. In der Schlussfolgerung wird die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Ähnlichkeiten gelenkt, und es wird behauptet, daß wir mehr zu gewinnen haben, wenn wir ihre Zwecke verbinden, als wenn wir sie getrennt behandeln.

Dewey y Thorndike se consideran como las fuentes de los campos académicos de la filosofía y psicología de la educación, que empezaron a principios de este siglo. Sus programas generales en tanto que estudiosos e investigadores de campo en educación siguen siendo las formas básicas en que filósofos y psicólogos encaran los temas de la filosofía y la psicología de la educación. Aunque las ideas esenciales, y mismo los paradigmas de investigación específicos, han cambiado radicalmente en ambos campos en este siglo, en cuanto a sus metas universales, los filósofos y psicólogos de la educación persiguen metas generales similares a los de Thorndike

y Dewey. Sin embargo, estos dos campos han seguido rumbos separados. El argumento final llama la atención a sus semejanzas y sostiene que ganaríamos más en unir sus metas que en mantenerlas separadas.

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