

# Population and Enrolment Trends: 1961-2001

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Les changements survenus dans le cours démographique de la population canadienne auront un effet marquant et durable sur le système scolaire du pays. L'explosion démographique de l'après-guerre fut suivie d'une baisse prononcée de la fécondité et du taux de natalité. En admettant que ce bas taux de natalité se maintienne, les naissances vont augmenter du fait que les enfants issus de l'explosion démographique, vont eux aussi se reproduire. Il va s'ensuivre une baisse puis une hausse marquées de la clientèle d'âge scolaire.

L'inscription des jeunes à l'école va refléter le cours démographique parce que le taux d'inscription a presque atteint toute la clientèle visée (plus de 97% des enfants en âge d'être scolarisés) et qu'il se maintient à environ 20% au niveau post-secondaire.

Vers l'an 2001, il y aura, à tous les niveaux, un nombre plus important d'inscriptions, mais entre-temps, on connaîtra une baisse radicale.

Le taux d'inscription variera beaucoup d'une région à l'autre et même à l'intérieur des régions; il variera aussi en fonction des années scolaires (grades). Ce mouvement aura bien entendu des répercussions sur le nombre d'enseignants, d'écoles, de matériel pédagogique et de subventions . . . dont on aura besoin.

Il est important d'organiser la planification de tout le système scolaire si l'on veut faire face à ces problèmes.

## INTRODUCTION

According to Canadian law, education is compulsory up to the mid-teenage years. The advance of technology and stiff competition for jobs have made several more years of study necessary for most people. Thus, almost every child in Canada will attend school for a considerable period of time.

Students are both the input and the output of the education system. In other productive enterprises, the capacity of available facilities determines the quantity of output. But in education, facilities must be adapted to accommodate whatever number of children there happen to be. The education system, particularly at the elementary and secondary levels, has no power to regulate this input; rather, the number of students is the result of demographic factors over which the system has no control.

The postwar baby boom in Canada was a period marked by a steady increase in the birth rate. Following the increase, there was a sudden, sharp, and sustained decline in the level of fertility. Resultant turbulence in demographic patterns has begun to affect enrolment in the school system.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate to those concerned with Canadian education the consequences of the dramatic drop in births after the baby boom. The paper will (1) examine the effect of the fertility reversal on the size of the school-age population at national and regional

levels, and (2) outline consequences for the education system. The central theme is that in the future, enrolment trends at any level will be more dependent on the size of the relevant age group and less dependent on enrolment rates than in the past. This will be true both nationally and regionally.

### **THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION AND ENROLMENT**

There is a high correlation between population trends and enrolment. Figure 1 shows that the curve tracing national Grade 1 enrolment since 1960 is nearly identical to that representing live births six years earlier. Certain age groups, then, tend to be enrolled at predictable levels of education.

The Canadian education system is not homogeneous, but differs by province. To simplify discussion, three levels of education are described: elementary (Kindergarten to Grade 8); secondary (Grade 9 and above), and full-time postsecondary (university and non-university). The relevant age groups are 5–13, 14–17, and 18–24.

The highest correlation between enrolment and the relevant population occurs at the elementary level: nearly everyone 6–13 attends school. Only in Kindergarten is there much potential for a higher enrolment rate, since in some provinces the pre-Grade 1 enrolment rate is well below the national average. The 1974 enrolment rate, which relates elementary enrolment to the size of the 5–13 age group, was estimated at 98.0%.

Secondary enrolment, related to the number of 14–17-year-olds, was almost as high: 97.4%. But this is at the national level only; regional variations are significant. A further 1% or 2% increase overall is possible in the next 25 years. This depends on economic conditions, the job market, and students' attitudes.

Enrolment in post-secondary institutions has the lowest correlation with the relevant age group. However, more than 80% of full-time students are 18–24 years old. Their enrolment rate is now slightly under 20%. Expectations are that it will remain about 20% for the rest of the century.

Nevertheless, the main determinant of enrolment at any level of education is the size of the relevant population. Population projections for the 5–13 and 14–17 age groups are tantamount to elementary and secondary enrolment projections. The course of full-time postsecondary enrolment, assuming a constant rate, will follow the trends of the 18–24-year-old population until the turn of the century. But the picture of the future is not complete without some understanding of demographic events in the past.

### **PAST DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS**

The size of the school-age population depends on two demographic variables: (1) births the appropriate number of years earlier (the number of

FIGURE 1

Grade One Enrolment(1) and Live Births of 6-Years Earlier, Canada, 1960 to 1978  
 Effectifs scolaires de première année(1) et naissances vivantes 6 ans plus tôt, Canada, 1960 à 1978





FIGURE 2

Total Fertility Rates per 1,000 Women, Canada, 1941 to 1973  
 Taux de fécondité totale pour 1,000 femmes, Canada, 1941 à 1973



deaths is relatively unimportant in determining the size of the young population), and (2) net migration.

### 1. Births

The number of births in any year is contingent upon the size of the female population of child-bearing age (usually defined as 15 to 49) and the fertility rate. The total fertility rate is the average number of children, per 1000 women, born through the child-bearing years. Births in Canada over the last quarter century have reflected two major trends: the postwar baby boom and the abrupt decline in fertility after 1959 — the baby bust. Figure 2 shows the Canadian fertility rate from 1941 to 1973. Figure 3 graphs live births from 1921 to 1974. During the baby boom, the number of women of reproductive age rose 32% and the total fertility rate climbed from about 3000 to almost 4000. Consequently, the annual number of live births increased 60%: from 300,600 in 1945 to 479,300 in 1959.

Between 1959 and 1973, the ranks of potential mothers grew 35% from 4.1 million to 5.5 million. If the fertility rate had continued to climb, or remained at its 1959 level, there would have been more births each year. But starting in the early 1960s, fertility underwent a decline that was faster and steeper than the baby-boom rise. The rate fell to 1931 in 1973, which is below the level needed for zero population growth (ZPG): 2100. The result was a 28% decrease in the annual number of live births: 343,400 in 1973.

It is not practical to examine every province in detail, but Figure 5 shows that the total fertility rate in each one has followed the national tendency. However, the level of the rate varies. For instance, the 1973 rates were 2848 in Newfoundland; 1683 in Quebec, and 1874 in British Columbia. Ten years earlier, the corresponding figures were about double: 5420 (Newfoundland); 3470 (Quebec), and 3590 (British Columbia).

### 2. Migration

If the other demographic determinant of population growth, migration, were not so significant in Canada, future highs and lows of young age groups could be predicted quite satisfactorily from the fertility rate alone. But Canadians are among the most mobile people in the world.

When there are no governmental restrictions, population movement depends mainly on economic conditions. In Canada, this is the case for intra- and interprovincial migration. During the last 15 years, average gross interprovincial movement has ranged from about 375,000 to 435,000 annually. Such mobility could cancel the overall fertility decline in provinces that have net in-migration.

International movement is influenced by two additional conditions. One of these is the climate created by political exigencies. Immigration of large numbers of certain groups to Canada has taken place intermittently — for example, Hungarian refugees after 1956, Czechoslovakians in the late 1960s, and Vietnamese today.

FIGURE 3

Live Births in Canada, 1921 to 1974  
Naissances vivantes au Canada, 1921 à 1974




FIGURE 4

Immigration to Canada, 1921 to 1974  
Immigration au Canada, 1921 à 1974





FIGURE 5

Total Fertility Rates per 1,000 Women, Canada and the Provinces, 1921-1973  
Taux de fécondité pour 1,000 femmes, Canada et provinces, 1921-1973



The other condition affecting immigration is government policy, which is subject to frequent change. Figure 4 indicates that the annual number of immigrants since 1921 has varied considerably.

### POPULATION PROJECTIONS

Before describing the projected size of the school-age population over the next 25 years, a few words of caution are in order. *Projections are not predictions, but merely extrapolations of past and present circumstances into the future.* Subsequent changes can alter the shape of what is projected.

Population projections presented here are derived from a publication of the Census Field of Statistics Canada (1974), based on 1972 population estimates.

The publication contains several sets of projections made with various combinations of different fertility and migration assumptions. For discussion purposes, a single set was used here.

All the projections in this paper assume a medium fertility rate, although the rate has since fallen below that level. Thus, there were fewer births than projected.

Medium migration is assumed for national projections, but not necessarily for regional ones. The expectation was a net annual increase of about 60,000 through migration. But in 1974, almost a record number of immigrants (218,415) entered the country. Allowing for emigrants, net migration was well above 60,000.

The magnitude and timing of these population projections, therefore, may not be precisely as depicted. But the pattern — the waves — is inevitable.

Figures 6 to 11 graph the size of the school-age population of Canada and five regions (see pages 33–38). The actual situation is shown from 1961 to 1972. Curves beyond 1972 are projections.

The three relevant age groups (5–13, 14–17, and 18–24) are on the “A” scale, while for comparison, total population (0–99+) is on the “B” scale.

To a greater or lesser degree, every figure demonstrates the effect of the baby boom and the sharp drop in fertility and births after 1959. Each indicates that the current decline in the annual number of births is not anticipated to continue until the end of the century. In fact, even if the fertility rate remains low or falls further, a yearly increase in births is practically certain; only the timing is doubtful. The upturn could be delayed a few years, depending on the fertility rate. But all projections, regardless of fertility assumptions, indicate a second baby boom before 1985.

The explanation is simple. In the postwar period, there were relatively fewer prospective mothers, but on the average they had more children (almost four). As these children mature in the 1970s and early 1980s, the population increase of women of child-bearing age will more than offset the decline of the fertility rate. Even if each woman has only two children, there

will gradually be more live births every year, and finally the 1959 record will be surpassed, creating a second baby boom.

But between the booms, from 1959 to the present, the number of births has fallen. The small cohort born in that period will start to have children (20–30 years later) around the beginning of the 1990s. Since there will be fewer prospective mothers, there will be fewer babies, and once again, the size of the young population will diminish.

Hence, the age groups rise to a high when each contains a maximum number of postwar baby-boom children. This is followed by the decline created by the fertility reversal, then the second baby boom, and finally a drop — rather like the back of a two-humped camel.

### **NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS**

*5–13 Age Group.* The fertility turnaround has already thinned the ranks of the 5–13 age group which peaked at 4.1 million in 1970. (See Figure 6.) The decline will continue until the early 1980s, when there will be about 3.2 million children in this age range — a 21% drop of 900,000. But after the baby-boom generation begins to have children, the 5–13 population will take an upturn and reach an all-time high of almost 4.4 million in the mid-1990s — a 1.2 million increase in less than 15 years. By the end of the century, the group will have started to decline again. In 2001, there will be about 4.2 million children aged 5–13. This is only 100,000 more than there were in the postwar baby-boom peak year, 1970.

*14–17 Age Group.* The same patterns will characterize the 14–17 age group, but with some time lag. This group should reach a high of about 1,875,000 in the mid 1970s, and then fall to approximately 1,425,000 in the later 1980s — a 450,000 loss. Like the 5–13-year-olds, they will then increase to a new peak — almost 2 million — by the end of the century. Only after 2001 will the group decline again.

*18–24 Age Group.* Due to the increasing number of births in the 1950s, the 18–24 age group is still growing. People of these ages in 1974 were born between 1950 and 1956. But the annual number of births in Canada rose until 1959. Thus, a further 13–14% increase for the group will occur in the next seven or eight years. This means a rise from the 1974 total of 2.9 million to about 3.3 million in the early 1980s. As did the other groups, this one will then decline, dropping to approximately 2.6 million 10 years later — a 22% decrease. Thereafter, numbers will grow; by 2001, the gain will be 26% over the low, to a total of about 3.3 million. The second peak and subsequent drop will not happen until after the turn of the century.

### **REGIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS**

National projections by themselves are misleading. Therefore, projections for five regions are also included: the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia. Regional trends resemble national ones

in a general way only. This is not surprising in view of provincial fertility and migration differences.

Figures 7 and 10 indicate similar patterns for the Atlantic and Prairie regions. Recovery from the population decline is not complete for the 5–13 and 14–17 age groups before they start to decrease again, and the 18–24 group does not reach its former high by the end of the century. In the Atlantic Provinces, the second peak for the 5–13 and 14–17 age groups is about 98% of the first; and by 2001, the number of 18–24-year-olds is 91% of the baby-boom maximum.

In the Prairies, the second peaks for all three groups fall a little bit below previous highs. The two younger groups attain about 95% of the baby-boom crests, while at the turn of the century, the 18–24-year-old population rises to 90% of the former high. However, these projections aggregate four and three provinces respectively; hence, provincial differences could be considerable.

For Ontario and British Columbia (Figures 9 and 11) relatively mild declines after the baby-boom peaks are projected. Ensuing highs extend well beyond those peaks; and there is no subsequent drop. In Ontario, the 5–13 and 14–17 age groups level off by 2001, after having achieved more than 120% of the former maximum. The 18–24 age group continues to grow, although it is then about 110% of its first high. In British Columbia, after barely perceptible declines, growth continues. Moreover, instead of levelling off, each age group keeps increasing. At the turn of the century, the number of 5–13-year-olds will be about 147% of the baby-boom high; corresponding percentages for 14–17 and 18–24-year-olds are 139% and 124%.

Quebec, where the rapid fertility decline is combined with substantial out-migration, provides a sharp contrast (Figure 8). Since its 1968 high, the 5–13 age group has diminished; by the early 1980s, the loss will be more than 37%. The subsequent rise culminates ten years later in a total which is only about 81% of the baby-boom peak. The next decline is almost as steep as the first. Likewise, the size of Quebec's 14–17-year-old population is expected to wane. From the baby-boom high in 1975 to the low in the late 1980s, the loss is 43%. The second peak is expected near the end of the 1990s, but it falls short of the 1975 population by almost 20%. At the end of the century, the 18–24 age group is still growing, although it has attained only about 77% of the former high in 1980.

These regional projections conceal provincial and sub-provincial modifications. The advance of urbanization could nullify the effects of the population decline in metropolitan areas, while rural localities could be doubly hard-hit. Alternatively, suburban growth might occur at the expense of the school-age population of inner cities.

British Columbia illustrates how such discrepancies may be hidden. Figure 11 projects almost steady growth for the relevant age groups. This

accords with the findings of a recent study of the province (Picot, 1974). The study indicates that for the province as a whole, the 0–17 age group will probably remain constant between 1971 and 1981, and then increase approximately 15% by 1991. But a sub-provincial breakdown discloses that the change in the 0–17 population between 1971 and 1991 varies from –30% to +50% in different districts.

## **ENROLMENT**

### **Elementary–Secondary**

As demonstrated earlier, population projections for the 5–13 and 14–17 age groups are nearly the equivalent of enrolment projections. Because elementary school is compulsory, the size of enrolment is close to the size of the 5–13 age group. Secondary education is about the same, although students do have some degree of choice, and enrolment rates differ by region.

Since the 1970 total of 4.2 million, national elementary enrolment has fallen along with the 5–13 age group. By the early 1980s, it will be about 3.2 million. The loss alone almost equals Quebec's present elementary enrolment. But in the subsequent 15 years, enrolment will rise to a record 4.3 million. This 35% increase of 1.1 million pupils is more than the combined current elementary enrolments in British Columbia, the Prairies, and Newfoundland.

Secondary enrolment will increase until 1976, when it should total around 1.7 million. From then until the late 1980s, it will decline to 1.4 million. This loss of students exceeds public secondary school enrolment in the Prairie Provinces today. But in the next decade, there will be close to a 40% increase, resulting in a high of 1.98 million students.

From now to the turn of the century, the national net gain in elementary–secondary enrolment will be about 545,000 or 10%. If this rise were constant and uniform across the country, the educational system could adapt without too much difficulty. However, the enrolment slump in the 1980s and wide regional differences create problems for every sector of the educational establishment. Teachers, salaries, operating and capital expenditures, transportation, schools, and equipment are just some of the components of elementary–secondary education that will feel the impact of erratic enrolment patterns.

### **Postsecondary**

It was pointed out previously that 18–24-year-olds constitute about 80% of full-time postsecondary enrolment, and that the enrolment rate for this age group is about 20%. The rate is not expected to change much until the end of the century. Therefore, postsecondary enrolment should follow the contours of the 18–24 population curves in the next 25 years.

But before proceeding on the basis of this assumption of a 20% enrolment rate, the wide margin for error it allows must be outlined. There are

many factors, not operative at lower levels, that might affect postsecondary enrolment. Among them are job markets, government policy, economic conditions, and the philosophy of prospective students. Such factors are hard to determine for the immediate future — practically impossible to foresee decades ahead.

Furthermore, a 20% rate is assumed for the national level only. Speculations about postsecondary enrolment in different regions are especially questionable today when inflation and related financial considerations exert a major influence on the individual's decision and government support. For instance, there was a healthy percentage increase in postsecondary enrolment in one province from 1973 to 1974. But because the provincial government's funding was less than expected, it is doubtful that enrolment will continue to rise; more likely, the growth rate will slacken. In provinces which have not imposed financial restraints, postsecondary enrolment could increase.

If the free trend were allowed to act (that is, without government or economic restrictions), a higher rate would be possible. At the very least, it would not drop.

In any case, the proportion of young people seeking postsecondary education is not apt to decline significantly. And more important, in the future, demographic patterns will have a greater long-term influence on enrolment size than the variation of rates. This is because the pool of potential students will fluctuate drastically over a short time.

From the 1974 total of 567,500, the number of students is expected to rise to about 670,000 in 1982. But ten years later, the total will be 520,000 — a drop of 150,000 or 22.4% from the 1982 high. By the end of the century, enrolment should be about 660,000, and rising. Thus, from 1974 to 2001, a 16.3% net gain in the number of full-time postsecondary students is anticipated. Yet, as at the elementary-secondary level, the overall gain is preceded by a considerable loss, hitting its lowest point in the early 1990s. And all the concomitant problems of staff, facilities, and finance will affect postsecondary education as well.

### **“WAVES IN THE WAVES”**

The figures have demonstrated that major problems for education in the future will be created by the rapid fall and rise of enrolment. This appears as a deep trough in the population curves for the relevant age groups.

But there is another irregularity not immediately evident — the “waves in the waves” phenomenon. The age groups associated with the three levels of education: 5–13, 14–17, and 18–24, span nine, four, and seven single years, respectively. As the trend in the size of enrolment at any level of education changes direction, the decline or increase will not be evenly distributed by grade or by year of study. The change will take place first at the lower ages and later at the older ones. In other words, when elementary enrolment

starts to decrease, first Grade 1 will decline, next year Grade 2, then Grade 3, and so on. Meanwhile, Grade 7 and 8 enrolment will be growing. Within a year or two, for the first time in history, enrolment in Grade 8 will exceed that of Grade 1.

This phenomenon will also occur at the postsecondary level. The 18–24 age group as a whole is expected to increase in 1982, although ages 18, 19, and 20 will decline. Most undergraduate and non-university enrolment will thus be affected from 1980. At the same time, older ages will continue to grow for a few more years. Enrolment patterns will vary by year of study till the end of the century.

The point of these observations is that in the future, projecting enrolment from the size of the relevant age groups alone will not suffice. It was done in this paper only as a basis for discussion.

#### **POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF IRREGULAR ENROLMENT**

As enrolment at each level rises and falls, few components of the educational system will be unaffected. Teachers, physical accommodations, and finance are among the most obvious examples.

Unless student/teacher ratios are radically altered, the need for teachers will follow the trends of the population curves.

The average elementary pupil/teacher ratio is now approximately 24:1. Today there are about 158,000 full-time elementary teachers. Maintenance of the current ratio through the enrolment decline would require 24,100 fewer teachers by 1981. This surplus equals the entire elementary–secondary teaching force in British Columbia now. But to cope with the maximum enrolment produced by the second baby boom in the mid-1990s, about 180,000 teachers will be needed. The increase of 46,000 over the low is roughly equivalent to the present number of elementary and secondary teachers in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and all the Atlantic Provinces.

At the secondary level, the student/teacher ratio is about 16.8:1. In the peak enrolment year, 1976, there will be almost 109,000 secondary teachers. If the ratio is held constant as enrolment falls, about 26,000 of them will not be needed. At the end of the century, however, the requirement will have risen to 114,000. The increase is about 5000 over the 1976 total, and almost 32,000 over the low in the late 1980s.

When postsecondary enrolment reaches its first high in the early 1980s, about 56,000 teachers will be needed to maintain the current 12:1 student/teacher ratio. The full impact of the second baby boom will not hit postsecondary education before 2001. In fact, at the turn of the century, the number of teachers required will be about the same as in the early 1980s. But in the intervening years enrolment, and hence teacher demand, will drop about 22%. This means that 12,500 postsecondary teachers will be surplus in the early 1990s, if the present student/teacher ratio holds.

The average number of students in Canada's 15,700 elementary–secondary schools is now 354. As enrolment declines, in ten years 1800 fewer

schools will be needed to keep this average. However, by the late 1990s there will have to be about 17,600 schools to accommodate the anticipated enrolment increase.

If postsecondary institutions can avoid further expansion up to the peak enrolment years of the early 1980s, existing facilities will suffice until the end of the century. In 2001, postsecondary enrolment will have recovered from its decline only to about the level of the first baby-boom high in the early 1980s.

Changes in enrolment and the need for teachers and facilities will affect the financing of education. However, during the enrolment decline, smaller numbers of students will not necessarily result in proportionate savings. As enrolment falls, the choice will be between lower student/teacher ratios or staff cuts. Lower ratios raise costs, but so does the alternative. Teachers released in a cutback are likely to be at junior levels with lower salaries. Senior and specialized teachers with high wages will be retained, and the unit cost of education will rise.

Moreover, when enrolment declines the decline will be most evident in the least expensive areas of education. This is particularly true of postsecondary institutions, where the number of students in general arts and science courses is likely to decrease significantly. Meanwhile, enrolment in faculties like medicine and professional schools with restrictions on admission will be unchanged. Thus, a greater share of the burden of financing will shift to costlier programs.

Throughout the decline, buildings and equipment will have to be maintained. School closure and busing are possible at the elementary-secondary level, although this might not be an economy. In 1972, before the energy crisis, school transportation in Canada cost more than \$1 million a day. And despite dwindling numbers of students, investments still must be made in equipment, facilities, libraries, etc. to keep up with scientific and technological innovations. This is especially important for postsecondary institutions, which to attract even a reduced number of students must continually update their courses.

So it is that as enrolment falls, unit costs are likely to rise. And when enrolment at each level begins to recover, greater expenditures will be required: more students – more money.

## CONCLUSION

Difficulties caused by the crests and troughs in the population waves as they break against each level of the educational system cannot be overemphasized. No facet of education will be left untouched by the consequent contraction and expansion of enrolment. For each age group, in every region, no more than 16 years elapse between the high and low population points. In some cases, the turnaround takes as few as six years. Educational planners must start to devise comprehensive and co-ordinated methods of coping with the difficulties that population projections portend.

Educational planning cannot occur in a vacuum. Formal education is a process through which everyone must go to some extent, and the trend is definitely toward more education for all. Training received by an individual affects the course of his life, and the output of the educational system affects the character of a country. Thus, the task before educational planners requires them to work with demographers, manpower planners, government authorities, social scientists, and representatives of business and industry. Planning for the future will not be easy, but it must be done if impending problems are to be avoided.

#### **NOTE**


This article is adapted from a paper which the author presented to the annual conference of the International Society of Educational Planners in San Francisco, June 1975.

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FIGURE 6

Selected Age Group Populations of Relevance to School Enrolment, for Canada, 1961-2001  
 Population par groupe d'âges spécifique correspondant aux effectifs scolaires, Canada, 1961-2001



**FIGURE 7**  
**Selected Age Group Population Approximately Relevant to School Enrolment, Atlantic Provinces, 1961-2001**  
**Population par groupe d'âges spécifiques correspondant approximativement aux effectifs scolaires, provinces de l'Atlantique, 1961-2001**




FIGURE 8

Selected Age Group Population Approximately Relevant to School Enrolment, Quebec, 1961-2001  
 Population par groupe d'âges spécifiques correspondant approximativement aux effectifs scolaires, Québec, 1961-2001




FIGURE 9

Selected Age Group Population Approximately Relevant to School Enrolment, Ontario, 1961-2001  
 Population par groupe d'âges spécifiques correspondant approximativement aux effectifs scolaires, Ontario, 1961-2001




FIGURE 10

Selected Age Group Population Approximately Relevant to School Enrolment, Prairie Provinces, 1961-2001  
 Population par groupe d'âges spécifiques correspondant approximativement aux effectifs scolaires, provinces des Prairies, 1961-2001




FIGURE 11

Selected Age Group Population Approximately Relevant to School Enrolment, British Columbia 1961-2001  
 Population par groupe d'âges spécifiques correspondant approximativement aux effectifs scolaires, Colombie-Britannique, 1961-2001

